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Change and Continuity:
The Kompilasi and Indonesian
Islamic Courts'
Abstraksi: Dalam seratus tahun terakhir dunia Islam menyaksikan
p erubahan mendasar dalam kodifikasi hukum keluar ga Muslim. F enomena
ini berawnl ketika Turki memberlakukan Al-Majallat al-Ahkam al-
Adliyah, y an g kemu dian diikuti b erb a gni ne gar a di b elahqn dunia Mu sI im
lain. lndonesia bukanlsh pengecualian. Pada 1.99L negara berpenduduk
Muslim terbesar di dunia ini mengesahkan Kompilasi Hukum Islam (KHI)
melalui Instruksi Presiden (Inpres) No. 1/L99L. Meskipun sebelumnya
Indonesis telah menernpkan beberapa aturan dan bnhkan undang-undang
yang menyangkut hukum keluarga Islsm, KHI tetap merupaknn tonggak
penting legislasi hukum Islam. Ia menghimpun atau mengkompilasi aturan-
ntursn yang tersebar dalam berbagai kitab fiqh, ynng mencnkup masalah
perkazuinan, kezuarisan, dan perwakafan, secara komprehensif, Lebih dsri
itu, ia juga memasukkan sturan-aturan ynng bernuanss pembaruan dalsm
rangkn menj embatani ketegangan antsra hukum Islam, kepentingan negar a /
dan a dnt, y an g di b eb er ap a d aer ah di Ind on esi ct t el ah meni adi b a gian inher en
dari praktik hukum masyarakat sejak lama.
KHI ditetapkan sebagai referensi yang harus dirujuk oleh seluruh hakim
di pengadilan Agama ketika menyidangknn perkara, mengganti berbagai
aturan hukum Islam pada kitab-kitnb fiqh. Dengan demikian, KHI hadir
sebagai rujukan yang seragam bagi parn hakim dalam memutus perkara.
Karena itu, pemberlakusn KHI memiliki releaansi dengan konsep
rasionalisasi hukum di Indonesia. Iaberusahamerasionalisssi aturan-stursn
snkrsl hukum Islam ke dalnm format hukum yang terstruktur, rasional
dan modern.
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Mengambil bentuk atau format teks hukum modern yang pembuatannya
melibatkan tidak hanya ahli-ahli hukum Islam tetapi juga para 'ulsma
dan p emuka-p emuka or g anis asi- or gani sasi Islam di lndonesl,a, Kompilasi
Hukum Isla m dib ap tis seb agai p r o duk ij ma' (kons ensus)' ulama In done sia,
Meskipun demikian, keberadaanny a terny ata masih dip er deb atksn. HaI ini
berpengaruh terhadap praktikberacsra para hakim di Pengadilan Agama,
yang dalam beberapa hal masih diliputi kegamangan dalam memilih rujukan
hukum atas perknra yang mereka tangani.
Aretikel ini mendiskusikan sikap dan perilakuhakim dalam mengambil
pertimbangan hukum bagi perkara-p erkara yang merekn selesaikqn. Apakah
para hakim sudah secara konsisten merujuk pada I(HI dalam memutuskan
berbagai perknrq? Artikel ini mengungkapkan bahwa meskipun para hr*im
sudah merujuk kepada KHI, dalsm beberapa kasus mereka mssih
mempergunskan kitab kuning dan mengabaikan KHI. Lalu, faktor-faktor
dan alssan-alasan apa yang mendorong mereka mengabaikan KHI dan
merujuk pada sumber hukum lain, seperti kitab kuningT Artikel ini
menemukan bahrna, selsin demi kemaslafuttan publik dan kekhaznatiran
mereka menyimpang dari aturan fiqh yang sudah mapan, yang keduanya
merupaknn faktor yang bersifut knsuistik, keengganan ini berkait erat dengan
beberapa alasan-alassn lain yang lebih fundamental, yakni; keinginan kuat
para hnkim untuk mempertahankm kekhasan (karakteristik) pengadilan
agama dan kebutuhan untuk menjustifikasi putusan mdreka den$an
identitas keagamaan atsu simbol-simbol keagamaan, serta konsep ijtihad
yang mereka pegang kuat.
Ilntuk memperlihatkan fenomena tersebut dan adanya faktor-faktor
tersebut di atas secara transparan dan jelas,paper ini aknnmendiskusikannya
disertai penyajian beberapa contoh putusan. Alasan-alasan dan contoh-
contohnya yang bersifut kasuistik yang disajiknn menjelaskan bahzua
p eny imp an gan dar i KH I dan s e c ar a b er s am aan ke c en der un g an p ar a hakim
untuk merujuk kEada doktrin-doktrin fiqh mungkin hanya merupakan
fenomena dari sikap sebagian hakim saja. Namun fakor-faktor lain yang
disajikan dan bersifut uniaerssl dan fundamental memperlihatkan bshwa
fenomena tersebut merepresentasikan sikap dah perilaku umltm hakim di
Pengadilan Agama.
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his paper takes a closer look at judicial practices and judge-
ments in the Indonesian Islamic courts since the introduc-
tion of Komp il as i (f ull title : Komp il asi Hukum In don e s i a, KHI).
The Kompilasi covers Islamic legal rules, particularly family law,
derived from various fiqh texts.The Kompilasl is divided into three
books. Book One addresses marriage and divorce law. Book Two
covers inheritance. Book Three is about endowment (zuaqfl. The
material is subdivided by topic into books, chapters, and articles,
beginning with a chapter addressing general provisions, followed
by chapters treating specific subject areas in each book.
This paper examines how judges in the Lrdonesian Islamic courts
have referred to the Kompilasi in deciding legal cases put before them.
Before the issuing of the Kompilasi, judges in the hrdonesian Islamic
courts decided legal cases brought before them largely on the basis
of "classical fiqh texts". The Islamic legal thought reflected in such
texts was usually identified as "jurist law" and was characterizedby
its focus on the casuistic method. On the one hand, as a jurist law, the
fiqh texts were largely hypothetical rather than reality-oriented. On
the other hand, the casuistry of fiqh texts is closely related to the
structure of legal concepts, which was the outcome of an analogical
way of thinking. As a consequence, there was no distinct structure of
law which could guarantee certainty in legal transactions in society.l
The lack of "positive law" in the Islamic judicial system in Indone-
sia prior to the introduction of the Kompilnsihad meant that the actual
practices and judgements handed dovrn by judges in the Indonesian
Islamic courts were arbitrary in character. In making their decisions
they were heavily influenced by n"adhhnb affiliations, in which subjec-
tive preferences significantly determined what they considered the
truth. This situation resulted in legal ambiguity. It was possible for
disputants to ignore the authority of the decisions issued by the Is-
lamic courts, by questioning their religious validity in the light of
classicalfiqh doctrines. It was in an effort to rid the Islamic legal sys-
tem of this ambiguity that the Kompilasi was introduced
In looking more deeply at the impact of the Kompilasi I shall
take account of not only the Islamic courts' use of the fiqh books
but also ask: (1) whether or not the legal doctrines of the fiqh books
have been maintained in dealing with the cases for which the Ko-
mpilasi sets different rules, in order to determine if the Kompilasi
has been fully applied; (2) and to what extent the application of
the Kompilasl has influenced the actual judicial Process in the Is-
lamic courts.
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Considering the Public Interest
In what appears to be the majority of cases, judges in the Islam-
ic courts have followed the provisions of the Kompilasi in deciding
the legal cases brought before them. This is apparent in the judge-
ments of the Islamic Court in South Jakarta (No. 19lpdt.p/L997 /
PAJS), which refused a request for confirmation of marriage (ithbAt
nikaft) on the basis of the fact that it was requested by only one
party, while the other party (the alleged husband) denied the
marriage had ever taken place. The Kompilasi insists that the con-
firmation of marriage must be requested and agreed upon by a
couple for their own welfare. Similarly, the judges of the Islamic
court of Tasikmalaya (decision No. LL /pdt .p / 2007 /PA.Tsm), per-
mitted a person to conclude a polygamous marriage only after the
petitioner (the husband) could prove solid grounds for the need
for a second wife. In this case, the wife had an incurable disease,
and after he produced evidence of his capacity to finance the liv-
ing expenses of his other wife/wives,'as well as obtained the first
wife's consent, he was given permission to marry again. In earlier
cases, the judges of the Islamic court of Nganjuk refused to give a
husband permission to take a second wife because it was known
that the first wife, though yet to give birth, had no medical issues
that would prevent her from conceiving in the future. The hus-
band further argued that he had had sexual relations with the
prospective second wife, which was then also put forward as a
reason for the petition, but this line of argument was also rejected
on the basis that the satisfying one's sexual appetite was not men-
tioned in the Kompilasi as sufficient reasoning for taking a second
wife.2
Not all cases/ however, demonstrate judges' concurrence with
the Kompilasi, and some judgements have in fact demonstrated
that in a number of cases ihey have deviated from the Kompilnsi
and referred to the fiqh books instead. They are apparently not
worried that their decisions will be overturned by higher courts.3
There are fundamental reasons behind their decisions to abandon
the Kompilasi. Among these reasons is their intehtion to uphold
the public interest. As a matter of fact, many judges argue that
deviation from the rules prescribed in the Kompilasl is sometimes
needed to create public will or to guarantee the satisfaction of
justice for the parties or one of the parties engaged in a case. There-
fore, in certain cases a number of rules in the Kompilasi are not to
be obeyed absolutely.
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Hadana
The rule of the custody (I.taiana) of a child aged below twelve
years is the best example in this context. Article 105 of the Kompila-
sl lays down that hndtua of a child aged below twelve falls to his
or her mother if his or her parents are divorced. Although they
agree with this rule and mostly follow it, in practice, judges some-
times conclude that it is not always good to give all mothers this
responsibility without due consideration; a small number of moth-
ers of bad character, such as those addicted to drugs or those
planning to marry another man, could be considered inappropri-
ate parents. As the choice of giving the right of haddna to one of
the divorced parties aims to ensure the good welfare of the chil-
dren, judges maintain that such a rule is not always to be followed
and can be ignored where necessary to ensure the interests of the
child's welfare is maintained.
Accordingly, in some cases judges have decided to grant the
rights to the father.a The Islamic court of Bogor once ordered a
mother to be deprived of the right of hadana because it considered
her incapable of taking care of her children for the reason that she
plannedto marry again soon after she divorced her first husband.
The court based its decision on the fiqh doctrine stipulating that
one of the qualifications for a mother to be given the right of hnddna
is that she has no plans to marry again soon and that she ii.as ffih(full of love and care). They'qhbooks cited in this case are Dimas-
qt's Kifayat al-Akhyar, Vol II, p.L52, and Bajurt's Hashiya Kifdyat al-
Aklryar, Vol. II, p. 198), The statement from the former reads as
follows: "And to retain charge of a child the guardian must pos-
sess certain qualities such as reason/ freedom, peity,love, trust-
worthiness, having achieved a settlement with the child, and have
no plans for remarriage. If he or she fails in one of these capaci-
ties, he or she loses his or her right of custody." And the doctrine
from the latter reads as follows: "[the guardian must be] caring
and honest and someone failing to pray has no right of custody."
In another case, the Islamic court of Rangkasbitung gave the right
of hadana of the children aged below twelve to their father on the
basis of the consideration that the mother was not pious in her
religion and that all the members of her family were non-Mus-
lims. As a basis for its decision, it mentioned the legal doctrine
from al-Bajnrls Hashiya Kiffoat al-Akhynr, Vol. 3, p.203 stating that
"...there is no right of hndana for the mother who is religiously
deviant."
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In principle, the Kompilasi stipulates that hnddna of children
should be first passed to women on the mother's side if the moth-
er is considered to be incapable of assuming it.5 But the fact that
familial relationships are so close in Indonesia provides a founda-
tion for some judges to give the right of haddna directly to the
father, as giving it to, for example, an aunt or grandparent on the
mother's side can mean in effect still giving it to the mother.6 In
this respect, it should be mentioned that the Kompilasi indeed rules
that to guarantee the safety of the children physically and spiritu-
ally, an Islamic court can transfer the right of hnddna from one
nominee to others.
In the case of mumayyiz children (those who have reached ma-
turity or those, according to the Kompilasi, aged above twelve
years), the Kompilasi states that they are free to choose one of their
parents to be their guardian.T In one such case (judgement No.
746/199L/PA.MDN), the Islamic court of Medan decided to give
the haddna of the disputants' two under-aged children to their
mother and agreed with the decision of the other two children,
aged twenty and seventeen years, to live with their father who
happened to have reverted to his previous religion, Christianity.
In this decision, they followed the Kompilasi.
This judgement attracted a great deal of criticism from some
Islamic legal experts and judges. Satria Effendi, a professor at the
Syarif Hida"yatullah State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta, who
regularly analyses decisions issued by the Islamic courts, criticized
the judges who handed down the judgement for having not been
circumspect enough in considering the possibility that the father
may have harboured bad intentions to influence his two older chil-
dren. He argued that under such conditions, the children should
not to be given their right to choose freely with whom they will
live and hence judges must choose for them who is the best guard-
ian in terms of their religion. He went on to say that the majority
of 'ulama'including the Shafi'rte agreed that such a condition robs
people of the right of hndana of their children. Therefore, if in a
Muslim family a spouse commits apostasy and this results in a
divorce, the hnddna of their children must automatically be given
to the party who is still Muslim.s As the basis for this he referred
to the opinions of the majority of classical'ulamd', including the
Shafi'rtes, who hold that being Muslim is one of the absolute con-
ditions for a person to be a guardian; non-Muslims or apostates
will automatically lose their rights of custody.e
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Age of Marriage
Another example is the rule concerning the age of marriage for
girls and boys. The Kompilasi (Art. 15) and the Marriage Law (Art.
7) both stipulate that girls and boys can enter into marital life if
they have attained the age of sixteen years (girls) or nineteen years
(boys). Broadly speaking, judges agree with the rule, but for a
number of reasons they occasionally ignore it and give permission
to those under the minimum statutory age to marry. It is true that
the Law allows the dispensation for marriage to be given to those
under the required ages.lo The reasons for such a case are when
the parents of a girl or a boy under the ages of sixteen and nine-
teen respectively consider that the couple have been intimate with
each other to the point where it is feared that pre-marital inter-
course has occurred between them. Alternatively, a parent may
argue that the couple is already sufficiently mature and they wish
to see their child married, and will not brook the refusal of the
registry officials to marry their daughter or son. As a result, they
bring the case to the court, requesting formal permission to marry
their child. After hearing and considering the reasons and the sit-
uation of both the girl and the boy, which may be, for example,
that the girl has reached maturity, and this is indicated by the fact
that she is menstruating, a number of judges may find that they
should approve the request and issue a decision stating that the
girl or the boy can be officially married with her boyfriend or his
girlfriend and therefore direct the official registrar of the place of
origin of the girl or the boy to marry them.11
To support their decisions, judges pointed out the legal doc-
trine which states "...and the claim of a girl that she has reached
her maturity may be accepted because she has experienced men-
struation" presented in al-DimydtT's I'anat al-f,alib-m, vol. 11,, p.3L4,
and / or the legal doctrine that states " . . . and the guardian of a boy
may marry him if he sees in it something beneficial and good",
presented in al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 1-1, P. 40.To strengthen their
decisions, they refer to an Islamic legal maxim which states
"...avoiding deficiency must be prioritized over the bringing of
advantages". In doing so, they have tried to show that marriage
at ages younger than those specified in the Kompilasi is more ap-
propriate as it will prevent negative consequences.
From these examples, we can see how cultural assumptions,
legal approaches, and substantive law are all deeply interlinked.
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Therefore, it appears that judges often do not decide cases in ac-
cordance with the dictum of the law, but because the social utility
demands this to be so. In Islamic law, judges frequently encounter
the concepts of istihsdn and istillah, forms of legal reasoning by
means of analogy. These concepts incorporate the idea that analo-
gies may be described with a clear eye to the social well-being at
large rather than to a strict set of logically required results.l2 None
the less, although we have already seen a number of cases in which
legal presumptions are really little more than the judicial recogni-
tion of local assumptions, we observe that, through their judge-
ments, judges always need to demonstrate that they have not de-
viated from the Qur'an and other sources of Islamic law. They are
convinced that the legal doctrines from the classical texts consti-
tute the best sources for their judgements when they thought the
strict application of the new code of law or the Kompilasi would
cause harm and prevent serving the public utility. These two ex-
amples indicate that the deliberate ignoring of the Kompilasi by
judges and their continuing reliance on the fiqh books is because
the Kompilasi is casuistically perceived as an inappropriate text to
be followed.
Against the Deviation of the Kompilasi
from the FiqhTexts
In other cases judges reject the rules in the Kompilasi because
they claim that in some cases they have deviated too far from the
classical fiqh doctrines. In cases of inheritance, for instance, they
often abandon its provisions which happen to be being hotly de-
bated by Muslim scholars and judges themselves. The reflections
in this debate reveal that a number of judges are quite adamant in
their repudiation of the Kompilasi.
D aught er aer sus S iblin gs
The first example is related to the inheritance rule as best illus-
trated by the two following cases (No.830/G/1991/PA.Pkl/No.69l
G / 1,992 / PTA.Smrg, and No.85 / pdt.6 / 1.992 / V / P A.Mtr / No. 19 /
Pdt.G/1,993/PTA).13 The first case involves a daughter and a num-
ber of sisters, all of whom were designated as co-heirs with the
former by the first instance Islamic court of Pekalongan and the
appellate court of Semarang. The second case, which attracted great
attention from legal analysts and scholars, involves a brother of
the deceased and a daughter.l4 It is not known whether or not the
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litigants understood what the Kompilasi says about their case, but
the heirs of the brother of the deceased in the second case came to
the first-instance Islamic court claiming a share of the property on
the basis that, as the brother of the deceased, their progenitor
deserved to share with the deceased's daughter 
- 
while the daugh-
ter was still alive, the brother had died when the case was filed at
the court, but was, of course, alive when his brother (praepositus)
died. The court concluded that the case bristled with too many
problems as the property disputed was not clear and, as the peti-
tion was considered not to have met the procedural requirements,
therefore they rejected the case.ls Being dissatisfied with the deci-
sion, both the plaintiffs and the defendant took the case to the
appellate Islamic court and it agreed the brother be given a share.
Handing down the decision that the brother, in the second case,
as the sisters in the first case, should share with the daughter, it is
clear that the appellate court of Mataram and the lower courts of
Semarang adopted a juristic interpretation of a relevant Qur'anic
verse/ which states that the siblings, sisters and brothers, are grant-
ed rights in inheritance if the deceased leaves no child or walad
(IY:176).Itis common knowledge thatthe majorityof Sunni scholars
have understood from this verse that, when the deceased leaves a
child or walad the siblings are excluded from the share and that, so
as to reconcile the practice of the Prophet who once gave sisters
shares with daughters, they have interpreted the word znalad in
this verse to refer to male children only.16 This means that in the
existence of a daughter the siblings can be granted a share. It is on
the grounds of this traditional Sunnite interpretation that the word
walad refers to males only, that these Islamic courts granted the
brother a share.
In both cases the daughters appealed to the Supreme Court,
and the judges in the Supreme Court reversed the decision of both
appellate courts. They agreed that the daughters excluded the
brother (in the second case) and sisters (in the first case) from a
share, stating that as long as the deceased left children, either
male or female, the rights of inheritance of the deceased's blood
relations, with the exception of parents and spouse (not a blood
relation), are blocked. Interestingly, in this respect they referred
to the view of Ibn 'Abbas, one of the companions of the Prophet,
who interpreted the word walad in the verse mentioned above as
both male and female children, - a position which unleashed crit-
icism from a number of scholars and judges as they considered
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these Supreme Court judges, as will be discussed below, had mis-
understood Ibn 'Abbas - and did not, as of course the two appel-
late courts had, mention the Kompilasi as their basis at all.
What does the Kompilasi say in this regards? \A/hy did they not
refer to it? The Kompilasi, Articles 181 and L82, states that the rights
of inheritance of siblings can only be granted in the absence of
ansk. Anak is the exact translation of wrilad.r7 So, the Kompilasi rtles
as the Qur'an says. In principle, the word anak referc to both a
male and female child. F{owever, it seems that the use of the word
is still confusing to some judges who question whether it, as the
word zualad in the Qur'an, refers only to males as the Sunnite inter-
pretation or to both males and females as in Ibn'Abbas interpre-
tation.
This issue has provoked a heated debate among both judges
and specialists in Islamic law. This debate can be followed in the
monthly publication of the Directorate of Islamic Justice of the
Department of Religious Affairs, Mimbar Hukum, from which it
can be discovered that the position of the classical Sunnite doc-
trine among Indonesian Muslims, particularly specialists in Islam-
ic law and judges, remains so strongly entrenched to the extent
that many of them have dared to take a position against the Ko-
mpilnsi and even against the decision of the Supreme Court. Even
though the Supreme Court's decision had gained support from a
number of judges,18 the opposition to it is too significant to ignore.
In one of its issues, the journal published articles by Baidlawi
and RahmatSyafe'I, who presented the interpretations of the word
ztsslsd given by earlier jurists, including that of Ibn 'Abbas, and
connected these to the debate aroused by judicial practices, par-
ticularly in relation to the second case. Intending to counter the
view of the Supreme Court, in their articles both Baidlawi and
Syafe'i wrote that it is true that Ibn 'Abbas interpreted the word
walad as referring to both a male and a female child, but it is a
mistake to understand that his inclusion of female child under the
word zuslad as his intention to exclude a brother. Therefore the
Supreme Court would be in error if it took his (i.e. Ibn 'Abbas)
view as its legal basis for its decision. Ibn 'Abbas, they continued,
meant that it is only sister(s) and not brother(s) over whom a
daughter(s) takes precedence. In other words, they wanted to
emphasize unambiguously that Ibn 'Abbas thought that when the
deceased left behind male and female children, or only a male
child, the right of siblings, both brother(s) and sister(s) are super-
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seded. But if the deceased left behind only a daughter, it is only
the right of sister(s) and not of the brothers which is superseded,
therefore it is only when she is contested with sister(s) that the
daughter is considered walad. Explaining this, the writers wanted
to say that should the deceased have left only a daughter - as in
the second case discussed - the claim(s) of the brother(s) to the
share has clear bases in the views of both the Sunnite jurists and
Ibn 'Abbas. Therefore, they argue, the Supreme Court was mis-
taken when it cited and referred to Ibn 'Abbas' view to support
its decision of granting a full share to the daughter and at the
same time of excluding the brother from a share, as Ibn 'Abbas
himself did not intend it to be so.1e By understanding the opinion
of Ibn 'Abbas in this way, they also seemed to convey that the
decision of the Supreme Court that a daughter can take prece-
dence over sibling(s) was correct and had legal basis.2o
Several remarks can be made on the basis of these two cases.
First, it may be true, as Cammack has stated, that the Supreme
Court probably wanted to give direction to the future develop-
ment of Islamic inheritance doctrine and tried to be consistent with
the premise developed that male and female relatives enjoy an
equal position under the law.21 But the fact that the Supreme Court
judges did not refer to tLre Kompilasi or to theories proposed by a
number of Indonesian legal experts, for instance Hazairin's bilat-
eral theory, but to Ibn 'Abbas's view, demonstrated its lack of
confidence in the Kompilasi and its inclination towards the legal
doctrines from the fiqh books such as those used in the first in-
stance and appellate Islamic courts. Second, although the Depart-
ment of Religious Affairs has no authority to evaluate the legal
rulings of the Islamic courts, it feels a need to analyse and study
the judgements issued at all levels of the Islamic courts including
the Supreme Court. It must be, however, noted that if what the
Supreme Court practises implies the development of judicial mod-
el when appeals are made, what the Department of Religious Af-
fairs does, as reflected in Mimbar Hukum, constitute a kind of a
legal reflection confirming that there are other opinions on one
case which might also be proper or indeed even more proper to
apply.22 Moreover, Indonesian Muslim scholars also still argue that,
as they often invariably find that no two cases are precisely the
same since the people are not exactly the same, therefore the judg-
es could justifiably reach different judgements as long as the rea-
soning process remains the same.
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Ap ost asy within Marr iage
Another example which demonstrates judges' preference for
the legal doctrine from the fiqh books and decision to ignore the
provisions in the Kompilasi concerns the rule of apostasy in its rela-
tion to the marital relationship.
The Kompila.sl mentions that apostasy can be taken as grounds
for divorce and the consequences of this divorce actually can be
solved by a number of articles in the Kompilasi regulating the period
of iddah and the nafknh for the divorced wives. Article 153 (2b) states
that if the marriage is dissolved by divorce, - without outlining
how or for what reason the divorce occurs - the period of the idfurh
starts after the pronouncement of the divorce in the court, that is,
for those who are menstruating it lasts for three times of being
clean or is at least ninety days and for those who are not menstru-
ating it lasts ninety days, and for those who are pregnant it is until
the birth of the child. Many judges are confused about this issue.
The source of their confusion is their understanding that the mar-
riage is automatically dissolved as soon as the apostasy is commit-
ted, whereas they are requir.ed to treat this case just as other di-
vorce cases arising for other reasons. Were they consider it to be
only one of the reasons for dissolving a marriage, they would not
be confused. Furthermore, a great deal of doubt still exists regard-
ing whether or not wife who has become an apostate still has the
right of nafknh as well as rnltt'a from her husband, as they tended to
consider her as n*hij(disobedient). In this respect the judge I inter-
viewed argued that "...because the Kompilasi is silent on this, we
need to resort to ijtihAd by referring to the fiqh books" .
\'l/hile the Kompilasi seeks not to dissolve a marriage at a pre-
cise moment one of the parties commits apostasy, for those who
tend to refer to the fiqh books, one of the consequences of the
apostasy is the dissolution of the marriage and that it must be
acted upon as soon as the apostasy is committed.23
Parallel with this is the matter that while the Kompilasi tends to
stress the element of disharmony resulting from the act of aposta-
sy, the majority of judges are inclined to stress the act of apostasy
itself.2a One of the former chief judges of the Islamic courts, said
that a petition of divorce on the grounds of apostasy does not
acquire any attempts at reconciliation.2s Another judge strongly
suggested that the clause 'resulting in disharmony in the marital
life' attached to the word'murtad (apostate)' found in Article 116
(h) be eliminated, as it makes the rule itself vague. He asserts that
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the essence of the clause has been covered in the same Article
(1.16: f), which mentions continuous quarrelling as one of the
grounds for divorce. If the clause is maintained, the aim of Point
(h) is obscured, that is it is apostasy or disharmony to be consid-
ered. Apostasy can stand by itself as adequate grounds for the
judges to end the marital relationship of a couple' They are not
burdened by the necessity of proving the existence of disharmony
resulting from the act of apostasy.26
As a matter of fact, judges in the Islamic courts are inclined to
decide a case of apostasy on the basis of the apostasy itself. The
decision of the judges of the Islamic court of Tasikmalaya illustrates
the case. They decided to grant the petition for a divorce for a wom-
an who claimed that her husband had reverted to his previous reli-
gion, shonrn by the fact that he attended a church congregation ev-
ery Sunday. In their legal summing-up, they mentioned that there
was no need to summon the husband to appear before the court
because the court is not competent to try a non-Muslim, they thereby
added that the act of apostasy will unquestionably produce dishar-
mony in future should the marriage be permitted to continue.2T This
case clearly reveals that it is the act of apostasy itself which leads the
court to end the marriage. Reconciliation and even hearing from the
party who is an apostate is therefore unnecessary'
Another judgement issued by the Islamic court in Rangkasbi-
tung demonstrates more concretely that reconciliation is not to be
striven for in a divorce sought when one of a couple has become
an apostate and that the difference of religious faith was the stron-
gest motivation which led the judges to comply with the petition
for divorce. It is recorded in the judgement that a man petitioned
for divorce because he claimed that he had frequent disagreements
with his wife, and they had been apart since April 2003' It is also
recorded that the husband admitted since Januaty 2004 to have
reverted to his former religion, Christianit/, which he had em-
braced before marrying his wife. The wife, who contested the
husband's petition, stated that not everything husband had stat-
ed was true and that she still wanted to save her marriage al-
though the husband had reverted to his former religion. In deal-
ing with this case the judges decided to terminate the marriage.
What is of interest is that in their legal considerations they clearly
stressed the apostasy of the husband, attested to by the fact that
since January 2004the husband has been active in one of the church-
es in Rangkasbitung. They then referred to Article 116 (h) of the
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Kompilasi which mentions that apostasy constitutes one of the
grounds for divorce. It also cited the legal text from al-muhadh-
dhab,YoL2, p.54, which states '...if a couple or one of each be-
comes an apostate, the marriage is to be annulled....if the aposta-
sy occurs after a sexual relationship has been commenced the di-
vorce occurs after the expiry of the iddah pefiod,.28 In giving such
a judgement, the judges ignored the objection of the wife contest-
ing the husband's petition a^d had adduced the act of apostasy as
the main grounds for divorce, whereas it was clear that the apos-
tasy had basically been committed after the couple had been in-
volved in arguments for a long time and had separated. They did
not even seem to consider the possibility that, by stating that he
had reconverted to Christianity, the husband had merery intend-
ed to back up his petition and ensure that it was granted.
From the discussion above, it can be clearly inferred that judg-
es in the Islamic courts only accept the reform aspects introduced
by the Kompilasi which do not deviate greatly from the fiqh books.It seems that the Kompilasi has not had the force to shift the central
position of the established fiqh doctrine among Indonesian Mus-
lims. Even though it seeks to impose the registration of marriage
and limit the age of marriage for couples and insists that divorce
should follow due legal process, it still does not have the power
to interfere in the religious validity of a marriage for'which reli-
gious conditions and qualifications have been fulfilled. similarly,
the Kompilasi has failed to eliminate the cases of injustice arising
from the application of the Islamic law of inheritance by promot-
ing the bilateral system of inheritance which places the mare and
female links in the same position. It has no power to force judges
in the Islamic courts to abandon the fiqh doctrines in dealing with
the cases of inheritance. Paradoxically, they have continued to
demand the institutionalization of Islamic law by the state, an insis-
tence which is not complemented by their readiness to depart from
the legal doctrines prescribed in the fiqh books.
Maintenance of Tradition and Religious Identity:
Other factors
All of the factors discussed above become much more influen-
tial in the attitude of judges when they are coupled with the other
reasons which constitute more universal and fundamental reasons
of why judges in general hold on to fiqh doctrines in their judge-
ments. Besides the fact that the Kompilasi was put in effect only in
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the form of a Presidential Instruction, which has less legal force
than a Statute, and therefore is considered to be loosely binding,
the maintenance of tradition and the question of religious tradi-
tion constitute reasons for this trend. Recalling the replies given
by almost all the judges I interviewed when asked whether or not
their citation of and their preference for legal doctrines from the
fiqhbooks would be minimized or even pushed to one side when
the Kompilasi has become a Statute, the answer was 'No'. In other
words, concealed behind the fagade of their doubts about the le-
gal status of the Kompilasi there are apparently more intrinsic rea-
sons or other more profound explanations for their attitude.
The Maintenance of Tradition
The reluctance of the judges to abandon the use of the fiqh books
in their judicial practice after the upgrading of the legal status of the
Kompilasi to that of a statute indicates that they want to use the fiqh
books not only in a cases for which the Kompilasi (and subsequently
the statute) does not provide or takes different position from the
fiqhtexts.This reluctance apparently has to do with the distinguished
position enjoyed by the Islamic tradition among Indonesian Mus-
iims. Although ideas of reform are very much part of their religious
discourse, the position of tradition remains strong among them. In
fact, the majority of them are traditionalists attached to the largest
Muslim organization in the country, the Nahdlatul ulama. Among
them the position of the kitab kuning to which the Islamic courts
were historically and culturally oriented is quite central.2e
Comprehension of the influence exerted by traditional and cul-
tural elements on judges is strengthened by an examination of their
educational background and the system of their recruitment, in
both of which until now the fiqh book remains one of the topics
tested. Most of them graduated from pesantrens before continuing
their studies at a State Institute for Islamic studies (Institute Agama
Islam Negerl, or IAIN). In the pesantren the tradition of studying
and analysing fiqh books has always enjoyed a considerable posi-
tion.30 Although they have adopted a modern curriculum, t]]rle pe'
ssntren still also includes fiqh texts as an area of study. This famil-
iarity of the pesantren graduates with the fiqh books is formally
revived and refreshed as soon as they apply for a position as a
judge in the Islamic courts. In fact, in order to aspire to this posi-
iion, applicants should first pass an examination in, besides other
subjecis, the reading of certain fiqh books.31 A failure to read the
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fiqh books may disqualify an applicant from being appointed ajudge. zuffran sabrie, a senior staff member at the Diiectorate of
Islamic Justice in the Department of Religious Affairs, said that
being able to read fiqh books is an absolutely unconditionar quali-
fication for being a judge in the Islamic court up to the present
day. Sabrie expressed his opinion in these words:
we have to maintain the central position of the fiqh books in our environment,
that is the Islamic court, and this is why we should employ judges capable of
reading Arabic. I realized that the reading test for ArabiCcould not be rlearded
as the optimal way to do this as we still found judges employed in islamic
courts with no ability to read Arabic, even though they had passed the test.
But what is a better way than this? I am sure thal the quatity of ludges of theIslamic court in terms of Arabic will be worse if the test is not utilized.32
As the educational background of the majority of the appli-
cants is a pesantren education where the fiqh books were accorded
a central position in the study curriculum, not to mention the fact
that from the very start of their career Islamic court judges are
required to demonstrate a solid understanding of fiqh books - even
after the issuing of the Kompilasi 
- 
then it is not surprising that the
tradition of referring to fiqh books is so institutionalized, it might
even be said internalized.
Flere, it is feasible to argue that while such an intensity of feel-
ing for preserving an established tradition in a society, particular-
ly among judges in the Islamic courts in this case, persists, any
formalization of law (even at the higher levels of the legar system)
will not have a great effect on law enforcement. Therefore, the
thesis which states that the rule of law, which had been judicially
established, will be loyally obeyed, as it has fulfilled the formal
element of its legality, will not always be valid. It is an incontro-
vertible fact that the formal juridical dimension embraced by the
Kompilasi is not as effective in motivating the judges to apply it to
its fullest possible extent. They still prefer the fiqh books should
the Kompilasi adopt a different stance. Even should they agree with
the Kompilasi, they still exclusively explore the legal doctrines in
the fiqh books. To understand this attitude, we may turn to Hart,s
statement that the enactment of a law by Parliament or through
other instruments of legislation is not enough to effectuate the
validity of a law. The law must be internalized by such insiders in
the legal system as judges and lawyers, and in a wider sense by all
citizens.33 In the case of the Islamic law, merely enacting a law and
claiming it is Islamic will not be sufficient to ensure its validity if it
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is not linked to its real sources, namely, the Qur'an, tlite hadfth, and
the fiqh texts, as it is only through such linkages that the process of
the internalization of the law claimed to be Islamic can be accom-
plished. And the way to ensure that,the insiders believe that the
law is Islamic law and is based on the sources mentioned is to link
each provision of the law to a specific rule or general principles
contained in those sources.e
What Lawrence M. Friedmann has proposed also seems to be
relevant to this case. According to Friedmann, the application of
law is to be communicated in three dimensions, namely: the struc-
tural; the substantial; and the cultural. He suggests that applica-
tion will only be effective if all three dimensions have been con-
sidered. Therefore, although the law has been substantially and
structurally systematized, it will not have been applied well if , fot
example, a society has failed to alter its cultural attitude and tra-
ditional practices.3s Even though the three dimensions share an
equal position in this issue, it is not impossible that one of them
may play a more significant role than the others in a certain soci-
ety. The cultural factor can be, for example, considered more dom-
inant than the other two factors in the case of those groups in the
community which have strongly maintained their traditional model
in solving cases.36
In this regard one particular phenomenon is worth mentioning
here. It is that the greatest attempt to maintain and express the
preservation of the use of the fiqh texts is among the senior judges.
The judges in the first instance Islamic courts reported that the
senior judges in the Islamic appellate courts often strongly recom-
mend they preserve the use of tJne fiqh books and even vehement-
Iy claimed judgements in which no Arabic texts or the legal doc-
trines from the fiqh books have been cited are judgements issued
outside the Islamic courts.37 Indeed, as has been mentioned above,
research into the comparison between judgements issued by judg-
es in the first instance Islamic courts and by those in the appellate
Islamic courts found that the judgements issued by the latter are
more frequently grounded onfiqh books and many of their judge-
ments were overturned by the Supreme Court judges'
It seems that the psychological and sociological aspects invari-
ably contribute to the practice of the judges in the appellate Islam-
ic courts in giving judgements on the cases brought before them.
They have been working a's judges for a very long time, beginning
in Islamic courts in rural areas/ and their rank is usually lower
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than their counterparts in the urban Islamic courts. Then they are
appointed judges or even directors of Islamic courts in both rural
and urban areas and later again judges in the appellate Islamic
courts and the supreme Court. This wide experience and seniori-
ty have played a large part in their legal maturation process and
have often led them to an overstated attitude in deciding the rel-
evant legal considerations. such a position is easily understand-
able when we consider the psychological and sociological aspects
which have led to their independent decision to rely on the fiqh
books, coupled with the fact that they have become very accus-
tomed to using the fiqh books.
The Question of Religious Identity
The tendency of the judges in the Indonesian Islamic courts to
continue quoting the fiqh books becomes more readily explicable
when we observe the debates among Indonesian Muslims con-
cerning the issue of defining what is "Islamic" and what is not. By
debating such an issue they are actually trying to inscribe a reli-
gious identity. In this context the Arabic language plays a crucial
role, especially in giving people their religious identity. It simulta-
neously also emerges as a source of authority. A person,s author-
ity in Islamic knowledge is often determined by their mastery of
Arabic, or more precisely the fiqh books. For judges in the Islamic
courts there is always a need to demonstrate this mastery by pre-
serving the use of the fiqh books in their judicial practices so that
their authority as the guardians of Islamic law can be acknowl-
edged and accepted by society.
A number of judges were adamant that they feel more certain
and on firmer ground with citations in Arabic in their judgements.
The judgements are considered to be more accurate and binding
(afdal) on account of the insertion of the Arabic texts. The transfer
of the Islamic legal doctrines expressed in Arabic as covered in
the fiqh books to a more understandable and articulate language
presented in the Kompilasi is considered to be useful only in a few
cases, as a tool to help to understand the rules required to be
applied. In fact, although the judges refer to the Kompilasi and in
doing so follow its provisions in deciding some cases, they often
mention only the codes of its articles and rarely or indeed never
display its full texts or provisions. Instead, they afterwards cite
the opinions of the earlier 'ulama'in a full statement in Arabic.
"We simply have to be different from the other courts", said al-
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most all directors and judges of the Islamic courts in which I con-
ducted my research. "We are 'Islamic courts (judges)', and need
to show our identity", they argued. A few judges who do not
read tlne fiqh books fluently are accordingly also persuaded to cite
the Arabic legal statements from the fiqh books. In this regard, it
is interesting to mention here that since 2004 judges of the Islamic
court in Cianjur have written the basmallah (Bismillah ar-rahmdn ar-
rahtm, or 'In the name of Allah the most merciful the most most
kind') at the top of the judgement in Arabic script, whereas before
this was always written in Latin script.38 One of its judges men-
tioned that this is to demonstrate their religious identity, that is,
that they are judges of the Islamic court. In fact, another judge
confirmed that to read and write even a letter in Arabic script has
religious merit and is considered'ibadah.3e
The Arabic language and script do indeed enjoy a privileged
position among the Indonesian Muslims, particularly traditional-
ist'ulama'. They think both represent noble values in themselves;
hence they not only adhere to the Arabic language but also to
Arabic script and therefore when they write in and translate the
fiqh works into vernacular languages, they have done this almost
without exception in Arabic script.ao Aware of this, judges feel that
they need to comply with this orientation. The judges assume that
if they do not follow or respond to the legal awareness of the
community, the community will abandon the Islamic court. In fact,
they have sometimes heard that a certain community often claims
that the Islamic courts are no longer Islamic when it finds no Ara-
bic texts cited in its decisions. The community is more convinced
of the validity of a judgement that is supported by Arabic state-
ments. Therefore, to quote the Kompilasi is not enough to demon-
strate that they really know and comprehend the fiqh books or
master the classical sources of the rules of the Kompilasi.ar
This is palpable in the attitude displayed by judges when mak-
ing judgements on cases in which they agree with the provisions
of the Kompilasi.In these cases, judges usually mention the article
of the Kompilasi and then proceed to quote one or more opinions
of the 'ulama'drawn from certainfiqhbooks. The case of a divorce
related to the utterance of ta'Itq dalaq is probably the best example.
The Kompilasi, Article L16, rules that a divorce can be concluded
on the basis of the existence of various reasons, one of which is a
husband's violation of one or more points falling under ta'lIq dalaq.
This reason is listed as Point (g) of Article 116. In deciding such a
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case/ the judges usually mention Article L16 Point (g) of the Ko-
mpilasi as one of the legal bases for their judgements, but then also
quote thefiqh doctrine from Sharqawr's HAshiya'alial-Tahrlr which
reads "Whoever makes his talak dependent upon an action, the
talak is co-terminus with the performance of that action according
to the original pronouncement." -This is the case in almost all the
judgements in divorce cases in my collection.
For the judges demonstrating their mastery of the fiqh books is
also of special importance in reinforcing their position as religious
authorities outside the circle of the traditional authority, the'ulama'.
Broadly speaking, the litigants rarely bother about the legal basis
taken by the judges in deciding disputes or cases brought before
them. Most of the litigants who come to the Islamic courts are not
overly concerned about the legal reference for the judgements
handed down to them. They focus on the core of the judgements
themselves.
\A/hile a majority of litigants are ignorant of religious references,
a number of judges admitted that in a few cases references to the
fiqh books are necessary in order to convince the litigants, particu-
larly a defendant. In the case of divorce petitioned by a wife but
strongly opposed by her husband, for example, a judge feels a need
to put forward opinions of earlier 'ulamd which explain the rules
pertaining to the case specifically and clearly. A number of judges
said that in such a case, the husband often argued that he still loved
his wife and they had never quarrelled. Meanwhile the wife, while
also admitting that they had never had a serious clash, felt that she
could no longer live together with her husband. Hearing the case
and not being able to persuade the wife to retract her petitiory the
judges grant the petition. In doing so, the judges usually mention
Article L16 of the Kompilasl, but go on to give a more relevant legal
basis for the case. For this purpose, they quote the legal doctrine
which reads "...if the hatred of a wife towards her husband has
growrr more aggravated, her petition for divorce can ultimately be
approved in the court" (al-Anrar-r's Minhajal-dullab, vol.IV, p.346).az
They believe that referring to the opinions of earlier 'ulama'in the
fiqh books can convince the defendant that their approval of the
petition is based on a sound Islamic legal basis.
It can be inferred from this fact that the judges, while citing the
fiqhbooks, have not deviated fundamentally from the provisions of
tl'rc Kompilasi. In the first case of ta'lrq dalaq, it is very clear that the
judges adopted the provisions of the Komyilasi but also needed a
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justification or seal of legitimacy from the fiqh books. The second
example indicates that the judges needed to reveal the Islamic legal
basis more explicitlp by so doing they believed that the litigants,
particularly the one found against, would be satisfied and accept
the judgement. All of the examples indicate that judges often felt
the need for more legitimacy and justification to endorse their judge-
ments, and are convinced that the fiqh texts can fulfil this need.
But why are Indonesian Muslims, the'ulamd' and therefore also
the judges, so very concerned about revealing their religious iden-
tities and consider the Arabic language to be one of the signifiers
of their religious identity? The answer seems to be partly related
to their rigid adherence to the Shafi'rte school. Indeed, in contrast
to the other Sunnite schools, particularly the Hanafites, Shafi'Ttes
believe that iearning Arabic is obligatory upon every believer in
order that he or she is able to perform his or her religious obliga-
tions properly. Al-Shafi't (d.829 /204), in his Risala, stated:
It is obligatory upon every Muslim to learn the Arab tongue to the utmost of
his power in order (to be able) to profess through it that there is no God at all
but God and Muhammad is His servant and Apostle', and to recite in it (i.e.,
the Arabic tongue) the Book of God, and to utter in mentioning what is
incumbent upon him, the takbrr, the tasbTh and the tashahhud and others.
\Arhatever learning he gains of the language which God made to be the language
of him (Muhammad), by whom He sealed His prophethood and by whom He
revealed the last of His Books, is for his (man's) welfare, iust as it is his
(duty) to learn (how) to pray and recite the dhikr in it.... Calling the attention
of the public to the fact that the Qur'an was revealed in the Arab tongue in
particular is (a sincere piece) of advice to (all) Muslims.a3
The unique position of the Arabic language in the Islamic courts
may not seem so very surprising and can be logically understood
when we recall the religious doctrine which emphasizes that judg-
es in the Islamic court have a religious responsibility, namely: they
are not only responsible for the present life (dunya), but also re-
sponsible for the Hereafter (al-akh-tra). They are very much tied by
the religious doctrine which states that in deciding legal cases, the
judge is standing with one of his legs in the area of enjoyment
(paradise) and the other in the area of frustration and irritation
(hell). Saddled with such a burden, it is understandable that they
need to say a special prayer or even meditate and reflect (bertafakkur)
before they decide the cases passed on to them. Consequently it
seems that they feel that to articulate religious nuances and fulfil
their heavy religious responsibility they still need to quote Arabic
texts fromf qh books.aa
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Conclusion
It is quite apparent that judges in the Indonesian Islamic courts
have demonstrated their concern about the Kompilasi since its in-
troduction in1991,. They have quoted its articles as the foundation
for their judgements. But the acceptance of the Kompilasl had not
led them to abandon their preference to quote the legal doctrines
from the fiqh books. The discussion above has demonstrated that
the tendency to continue quoting the fiqh books among the judges
is based on a number of reasons. In terms of their preference for
their legal doctrines to the provisions in the Kompilasi, cultural
assumptions in which the public interest takes priority do seem
indeed to have been confined. We have already seen a number of
examples in which their decisions were determined by their un-
derstanding of local concepts and customs and for which an at-
tempt has been made to find legal support in tlire fiqh books. Faced
with cases of petitions such as hadana and in giving permission for
under-aged couples to get married, which if acceded to by the
judges could have a positive effect according to local assumptions
but is not allowed according to the Kompilasi, judges have often
looked to the fiqh books and followed a distinctive approach, dar-
ing to oppose tLre Kompilasl. They have considered that it is better
for the common good that the rules of the Kompilasi be set aside in
favour of a judgement which is more suitable to achieving a so-
cially beneficial goal. Prioritizing a local assumption above that
which is set in the Kompilasi when solving such cases however does
not seem to have given the judges satisfaction in terms of their
legal reasoning. To support their application of such a distinctive
approach, besides weighing up whether it will be beneficial, they
need to present it in such a way which demonstrates conformity
with the sources of the Islamic law.
In other cases judges have been inclined to quote legal doc-
trines fuom the fiqh books to such an extent that they abandon the
provisions in the Kompilasi entirely. Many judges feel that the Ko-
mpilasi has exceeded its brief in adopting such local practices as
the representation of heirs and adoption or in heeding the grow-
ing demands among feminists for putting male and female in the
same position. They have sought to demonstrate their repudia-
tion by enthusiastically returning to the dominant opinion of 'ulamd
covered in the fiqh books.
Moreover, other more fundamental and universal factors
strengthened the attitude of judges toward ttre Kompilasl. In fact,
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as judges of the Islamic courts which are religious in character,
they feel a need to justify their judgements on the basis of reli-
gious texts. By doing so, they associate themselves with a reli-
gious corpus which belongs exclusively to 'ulama'. Most certainly,
they are required to demonstrate their understanding of religious
texts so that society is convinced of the validity of their judge-
ments. However, they have shown a tendency to exaggerate and
have displayed inappropriate attitudes in quoting these religious
texts, indicating that the quotation itself is treated more as a dec-
oration at the expense of its content.
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